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Abstract
We present an extension of Heyting arithmetic in finite types called Uniform Heyting Arithmetic
(HAu) that allows for the extraction of optimized programs from constructive and classical proofs.
The system HAu has two sorts of first-order quantifiers: ordinary quantifiers governed by the
usual rules, and uniform quantifiers subject to stronger variable conditions expressing roughly
that the quantified object is not computationally used in the proof. We combine a Kripke-style
Friedman/Dragalin translation which is inspired by work of Coquand and Hofmann and a variant
of the refined A-translation due to Buchholz, Schwichtenberg and the author to extract programs
from a rather large class of classical first-order proofs while keeping explicit control over the levels
of recursion and the decision procedures for predicates used in the extracted program.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
According to the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation of constructive logic
a proof is a construction providing evidence for the proven formula [21]. Viewing this
interpretation from a data-oriented perspective one arrives at the so-called proofs-as-
programs paradigm associating a constructive proof with a program ‘realizing’ the proven
formula. This paradigm has been proposed as the basis of a new methodology for the
synthesis of provably correct software. In several proof systems supporting computer aided
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program synthesis from proofs (e.g. Agda, Coq, Minlog, NuPrL, PX) rather large case
studies have been carried out which seem to indicate that this indeed opens a promising
path to secure software. An objection often raised against this approach is that it seems to
be too ‘indirect’ to be a viable programming technique, i.e. when proving a formula we do
not ‘see’ the program and hence do not have enough control over it.
The ‘gap’ between a proof and the program it represents appears to be particularly
large when the proofs-as-program paradigm is extended to (a restricted class of) classical,
i.e. non-constructive, proofs (see e.g. [15,1,14,7,12,8] for different methods of extracting
computational content from classical proofs). For example, if we prove classically the well-
foundedness of the usual ordering on the natural numbers, i.e.
∀ f : N → N ∃n : N f (n) > f (n + 1),
by applying the least element principle to the range of f , it seems that the program
contained in this proof should compute for each function f the point n where f assumes
its minimum, which is impossible, of course. What the extracted program really does is to
search from n := f (0) + 1 downwards until an n is found where f (n) > f (n + 1). This
search strategy does not seem to be visible in the proof [6].
Nevertheless a lot of work has been done to develop the proofs-as-programs paradigm
into a realistic programming methodology, and refined program extraction procedures
adapted to particular situations have been developed yielding optimized programs and
providing a fair amount of explicit control over essential parameters of the extracted
programs (e.g. [12,6,17]). This paper intends to make contributions in a similar direction
through a formal system called Uniform Heyting Arithmetic, HAu. The system HAu is an
extension of Heyting arithmetic in finite types with two sorts of first-order quantifiers,
ordinary quantifiers governed by the usual logical rules and uniform quantifiers which are
subject to stronger variable conditions expressing roughly that the quantified object is not
computationally used in the proof. As a technical device we also include second-order
universal quantifiers with arithmetic comprehension.
Our work brings together ideas and results from the papers [4,9,6]. From [4] we
have taken the uniform quantifier {∀x} introduced there to extract the well-known
normalization-by-evaluation program from the Tait/Troelstra proof of strong normalization
of the simply typed lambda calculus. The effect of the uniform quantifier is that certain
unnecessary parameters do not occur in the extracted program.
The second crucial idea is a Kripke-style translation introduced by Coquand and
Hofmann [9] to give an elegant proof that with respect to Π 02 sentences classical Σ 01 -
arithmetic is conservative over its intuitionistic counterpart (which also follows from
a result of Parsons’ [16] that Σ 01 -arithmetic is conservative over primitive recursive
arithmetic). The benefit of the Kripke translation will be that the levels of recursion in
extracted programs are lower than in the ordinary A-translation used in [6]. Although [9]
is mainly concerned with foundational questions the authors of [9] also express their belief
that their method “should give rise to a more efficient program extraction procedure”.
In this paper we address this issue. From a (practical) computational point of view one
problem with the method in [9] is that in the translation quantifier free predicates are coded
into functions which leads to a proliferation of case analyses in extracted programs and
hence to inefficiency (see the Fibonacci example in Section 8). We will get around this
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problem by allowing proper second-order quantification. Using a normalization argument
we will, however, at the end get rid of second-order rules (Theorem 2.3).
The main inputs from [6] are the concepts of ‘definite’ and ‘goal’ formulas which fit
nicely with the Kripke translation and allow us to reduce the number of predicates that
need to be double negated and hence to further reduce the number of predicates for which
decidability is needed in the extracted programs.
We illustrate our methods of extracting programs from proofs by some simple examples.
2. The system HAu
The types and terms of system HAu are (a minor extension of) the terms of Gödel’s
system T in its formulation as an applied typed lambda calculus.
Types, ρ, σ, . . . , are built from the base types boole and nat (and possibly other
base types), by products, ρ × σ , and function spaces, ρ → σ . The level of a type is
defined as usual by lev(τ ) = 0 if τ is a base type, lev(ρ × σ) = max(lev(ρ), lev(σ ))
and lev(ρ → σ) = max(1 + lev(ρ), lev(σ )). If T is a set of non-empty types we set
τ (T ) = max{levρ | ρ ∈ T }; τ (∅) = −1.
Terms, rρ, sσ , . . . , are built from typed variables, xρ, . . ., typed constants, cρ , including
0nat, (+1)nat→nat, Trueboole, Falseboole, Ifρboole→ρ→ρ→ρ (case analysis at type ρ) and
Recρρ→(nat→ρ→ρ)→nat→ρ (Gödel primitive recursion at type ρ), Zeronat→boole, by
pairing, p(rρ, sσ )ρ×σ , projection, pi (rρ0×ρ1)ρi (i = 0, 1), abstraction, (λxρ .rσ )ρ→σ , and
application, (rρ→σ sρ)σ . In addition to the usual β and η rules we assume rewrite rules for
the constants including
Ifρ True r s → r Recρ r s 0 → r Zero 0 → True
Ifρ False r s → s Recρr s (t + 1) → s t (Recρ r s t) Zero (t + 1) → False
such that the resulting rewrite system is confluent and strongly normalizing. We let nf(r)
be the normal form of r with respect to this rewrite system. We let reclev(r) (recursion
level of r ) be the maximum of all lev(ρ) such that the recursor Recρ occurs in the term r
provided that r contains at least one recursor. Otherwise reclev(r) := −1.
The atomic formulas of HAu are ⊥, P(	t) and X (	t) where P( 	ρ) is a predicate constant,
X ( 	ρ) is a predicate variable and 	t 	ρ are terms. We allow predicate constants and predicate
variables of arbitrary arities ( 	ρ). The set of predicate constants is not fixed, but we assume
that we have equality, =ρ , of arity (ρ, ρ) for every type ρ.
The formulas A, B of HAu are atomic formulas, A ∧ B , A → B , ∀x A, ∃x A, {∀x}A,
{∃x}A, ∀2 X A. The quantifiers {∀x} and {∃x} are called uniform quantifiers.
We set ∀(A) = ∀	x A where 	x is a listing of FV(A), the set of free object variables
of A (excluding predicate variables). A formula is called quantifier free if it contains no
predicate variables and no quantifiers other than ∀pboole or ∃pboole (note that uniform
boolean quantifiers are excluded). Given a set P of predicate constants, qf(P) denotes the
set of quantifier free formulas containing predicate constants from P only and no predicate
variables. By pc(A) we denote the set of predicate constants occurring in A. By A[t/x] we
denote A where t is substituted for every free occurrence of x (renaming bound variables
if necessary). Frequently, type information will be suppressed when derivable from the
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context or irrelevant. Terms and formulas coinciding up to renaming of bound variables
are identified. In order to save brackets we will frequently write, e.g. ∀x . A → B for
∀x (A → B), whereas ∀x A → B means (∀x A) → B . We set
¬A = A → ⊥
A ∨ B = ∃p.(p = True → A) ∧ (p = False → B).
The quantifier {∀x} was first used in [4] to optimize the program extracted from
the normalization proof for the simply typed lambda calculus based on computability
predicates. The idea behind uniform quantifiers is to express constructions that are
independent of the quantified variable. For example, a proof of {∃x}A represents a
construction of A[t/x] for some term t , ‘forgetting’ the witness t , whereas the construction
represented by a proof of ∃x A includes the witnessing term t . A more precise explanation
in terms of realizability will be given in Section 3.
A formula is called a first-order formula if it does not contain predicate variables (and
hence has no second-order quantifiers), it is called an arithmetic formula if it does not
contain second-order quantifiers (but may contain free predicate variables) and it is called
a Harrop formula if it contains neither the quantifier ∃x nor any predicate variable in a
strictly positive position1 (it may contain {∃x} strictly positively though).
If 	x 	ρ are object variables and B is a formula, then λ	x 	ρ B is called a predicate of arity
( 	ρ). If P = λ	x 	ρ B is a predicate and 	r 	ρ are terms then P(	r) denotes B[	r/	x]. If A is a
formula, X a predicate variable and P a predicate, both of arity 	ρ, we denote by A[P/X]
the result of replacing in A every subformula of the form X (	r) by P(	r) (possibly renaming
bound variables). We tacitly extend properties of formulas to properties of predicates in
the obvious way. For example, an arithmetic predicate is a predicate λ	x B where B is an
arithmetic formula. A predicate of arity (), say λA, will be identified with the formula A.
Also a propositional variable, that is, predicate variable X of arity (), will be identified with
the formula X ().
The derivation rules of HAu are displayed in Figs. 1 and 2. In a sequent Γ  M : A
the context Γ is a finite set of assumptions {u B11 , . . . , u Bnn } where the symbols ui are all
different and will be sometimes omitted. Usually we will also omit the set-forming curly
brackets and write a comma to denote the union of two sets. The variable conditions are
as usual: (†) = ‘x respectively X not free in Γ ’, (††) = ‘x not free in B’. The rules are
divided into normal rules (Fig. 1), which are as expected, and uniform and second-order
rules (Fig. 2). The uniform rule {∀}+ refers to the set CV(M) of computationally relevant
variables of a derivation M which in turn refers to the notion of a computationally relevant
term. By the latter we mean a term t that is used in M as an instantiating term in an ∀ -
elimination rule, ∀−(N, t), or as a witnessing term in an ∃ -introduction rule, ∃+λx A(t, N),
where the occurrence of that rule is not within a subderivation deriving a Harrop formula.
A computationally relevant variable is a free variable of a derivation2 which occurs (free)
in a computationally relevant term in M .
1 A position in a formula is called strictly positive if it is not contained in the premise of an implication.
2 An occurrence of a variable is free in a derivation if that occurrence is not bound by a quantifier or a
λ-abstraction.
U. Berger / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 125–148 129
Γ , u A  u A : A
Γ  M0 : A0 Γ  M1 : A1
Γ  ∧+(M0, M1) : A0 ∧ A1
Γ  M : A0 ∧ A1
Γ  ∧−i (M) : Ai
Γ , u A  M : B
Γ →+ (λu A M) : A → B
Γ  M : A → B Γ  N : A
Γ →− (M, N) : B
Γ  M : A (†)
Γ  ∀+(λx M) : ∀x A
Γ  M : ∀x A
Γ  ∀−(M, t) : A[t/x]
Γ  M : A[t/x]
Γ  ∃+λx A(t, M) : ∃x A
Γ  M : ∃x A Γ  N : ∀x .A → B (††)
Γ  ∃−(M, N) : B
nf(r) =α nf(s)
Γ  Refl(r, s) : r = s
Γ  M : A[r/x] Γ  N : r = s
Γ  Compλx A(M, N) : A[s/x]
Γ  M : True = False
Γ  Cont(M) : ⊥
Γ  M : ⊥
Γ  EfqA(M) : A
Γ  M:A[True/p] Γ  N :A[False/p]
Γ  Caseλp A(M, N) : ∀p A
Γ  M:A[0/n] Γ  N :∀n .A→A[n+1/n]
Γ  Indλn A(M, N) : ∀n A
Fig. 1. The normal rules of HAu.
The rules of HAu are designed such that when extracting programs from first-order
derivations (Section 3) we may ignore the uniform rules, except for the {∃}− rule, which
can be dealt with in a simplified way. In this paper the second-order part of HAu will only
be used as a technical tool to analyse its first-order part and for that purpose among the
predicate variables only propositional variables will be needed.
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Γ  M:A x ∈ CV(M) (†)
Γ  {∀}+(λx M) : {∀x}A
Γ  M : {∀x}A
Γ  {∀}−(M, t) : A[t/x]
Γ  M : A[t/x]
Γ  {∃}+λx A(t, M) : {∃x}A
Γ  M:{∃x}A Γ  N :{∀x}.A → B (††)
Γ  {∃}−(M, N) : B
Γ  M : A (†)
Γ  ∀+2 (λX M) : ∀2 X A
Γ  M : ∀2 X A P arithmetic
Γ  ∀−2 (M,P) : A[P/X]
Fig. 2. The uniform and second-order rules of HAu.
Remark. An interesting variant of HAu is obtained when in the comprehension rule
∀−2 (M,P) arbitrary Harrop predicates P are allowed. Although this system is proof-
theoretically equivalent to full second-order arithmetic it still has a realizability
interpretation by Gödel primitive recursive functionals (see also the remarks in Section 3).
A main goal of this paper is to control the recursions occurring in a program extracted
from a derivation in terms of the inductions used and the recursion operators occurring in
computationally relevant terms. We write
Γ I M : A
if Γ  M : A and I is a set of predicates and types such that the following two conditions
are satisfied: (1) in M every induction rule is of the form IndλnC(N0, N1) where C is an
arithmetic instance of I, i.e. C = B[ 	P, 	t/ 	X , 	x] with λnB ∈ I, 	P arithmetic predicates,
	t terms of appropriate arities and types respectively; (2) all recursors, Recρ , occurring
in a computationally relevant term in M have a type ρ ∈ I (it may seem a bit crude to
throw predicates and types into one set, but we find this appropriate in order not to let
notation become too cumbersome). We write Γ  A respectively Γ I A if Γ  M : A
respectively Γ I M : A for some derivation M . We also write
Γ I1 M : A (or Γ I1 A)
if Γ I M : A where M is a first-order derivation, that is, in M no second-order rules
occur.
It will be convenient to have two ways of (intuitionistically) expressing decidability of
a predicate. The first is to postulate the law of excluded middle:
LEM(P) := ∀	x . P(	x) ∨ ¬P(	x).
The second possibility is to explicitly state the existence of the characteristic function of
a predicate. To this end we fix for every predicate constant P of arity (	σ) a variable fP
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of type 	σ → boole and set
DEC(P) := ∀	x . P(	x) ↔ fP 	x = True.
Using the variables fP we can in the usual way define for every quantifier free formula
C a characteristic term tC of type boole as follows. tP(	t) = fP (	t), t⊥ = False,
tA∧B = If tA tB False, tA→B = If tA tBTrue, t∀p A = If tA[True/p] tA[False/p]False, t∃p A =
If tA[True/p] True tA[False/p]. Clearly tC is recursion free.
In the following we let P be a set of predicate constants and set DEC(P) := {DEC(P) |
P ∈ P}.
Lemma 2.1. (i) LEM(P) ∅1 B ∨ ¬B for each B ∈ qf(P).
(ii) DEC(P) ∅1 LEM(P).
(iii) DEC(pc(C)) ∅1 C ↔ tc = True for every quantifier free formula C.
Proof. (i) Easy induction on formulas in qf(P). (ii) Obvious. (iii) Induction on C . 
Above we extended the operations LEM(·) and DEC(·) from predicates to sets of
predicates. In a similar way we will often tacitly extend an operation on syntactic objects of
a certain kind (e.g. types, predicate symbols, formulas, predicates) to sets of such or similar
objects. For example, if I is a set of predicates or types (such as occur in ‘Γ I A’), then
¬I naturally denotes {λx¬P(x) | P ∈ I a predicate} ∪ {ρ | ρ ∈ I a type}.
We close this section with a simple but important conservativity result. Note that
we can view our system HAu as an extension of the intuitionistic finite type analogue
to the classical system ACA of second-order arithmetic with arithmetic comprehension
and unrestricted induction. If in ACA one restricts induction to arithmetic predicates,
one obtains the system ACA0 which is conservative over Peano Arithmetic [18]. Below
we show that the analogous system, that is, HAu with induction restricted to arithmetic
predicates, is conservative over the first-order part of HAu. However, we will not argue
model theoretically (as is done in [18]), but use proof-theoretic methods instead. We will
need the following substitution lemma.
Lemma 2.2. If Γ  M : A, then Γ [t/x]  M[t/x] : A[t/x] for any term t and
Γ [P/X]  M[P/X] : A[P/X] for every arithmetic predicate P .
Proof. Induction on M . Here it is important that in a Harrop formula no predicate variable
occurs strictly positively. 
Theorem 2.3. Assume Γ I A where Γ , A are arithmetic formulas and I consists of
arithmetic predicates. Then Γ I1 A.
Proof. Let us (just for this proof) call a derivation ‘admissible’ if it uses only arithmetic
instances of the rules Compλx A, EfqA and Indλn A. Since arbitrary instances of Comp
and Efq can be derived (without induction) from arithmetic (even atomic) instances of
these rules, we may assume that our given derivation of Γ I A is admissible. Using
normalization for second-order logic (due to Girard [10]) we can, by repeatedly applying
the usual β-conversions for second-order natural deduction, transform the given derivation
into a derivation Γ I M : A which is still admissible and which in addition is ‘normal’ in
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the sense that in a ∗-elimination, ∗ ∈ {∧,→,∀, ∃, {∀}, {∃},∀2}, the main premise deriving
the formula with ∗ as outermost constructor is not a ∗-introduction. By Lemma 2.2, β-
conversion does not spoil the special side conditions for the uniform and second-order
rules and clearly β-conversion also preserves admissibility. Now, by a straightforward
induction on normal admissible derivations ∆  N : B one simultaneously shows (1) if
∆, B are arithmetic, then N is first order; (2) if ∆ is arithmetic and N does not end with a
∗-introduction where ∗ is as above, then B is arithmetic and N is first order. Applying (1)
to M we see that M is first order. 
3. Realizability and program extraction
To every first-order non-Harrop formula A we assign a simple type τ (A), which will
be the type of programs extracted from derivations with end formula A: τ (A0 ∧ A1) =
τ (A0) × τ (A1) if both conjuncts are non-Harrop and = τ (A1−i ) if Ai is Harrop.
τ (A → B) = τ (A) → τ (B) if A is non-Harrop and = τ (B) if A is Harrop.
τ (∀xρ A) = ρ → τ (A). τ (∃xρ A) = ρ × τ (A) if A is non-Harrop and =ρ if A
is Harrop. Finally, τ ({∀x}A) = τ ({∃x}A) = τ (A). If B is a set of formulas we set
τ (B) = {τ (B) | B ∈ B, B non-Harrop}.
For every first-order non-Harrop formula A and every term r of type τ (A) we define
by structural recursion on A a formula r mr A, to be read as r modified realizes A.
Simultaneously we define for every first-order Harrop formula A a formula  mr A where
 should be thought of as the inhabitant of a singleton type. Our definition is taken from
[2] and corresponds to Kreisel’s modified realizability [13] (see also [20]). For non-Harrop
formulas we define
r mr (A0 ∧ A1) =
{
p0(r) mr A0 ∧ p1(r) mr A1 if A0, A1 are non-Harrop
 mr Ai ∧ r mr A1−i if Ai is Harrop
r mr (A → B) =
{
∀x .x mr A → r x mr B if A is non-Harrop
 mr A → r mr B if A is Harrop
r mr ∀xρ A = ∀x .r x mr A
r mr ∃xρ A =
{
p1(r) mr A[p0(r)/x] if A is non-Harrop
 mr A[r/x] if A is Harrop
r mr QA = Q(r mr A) where Q ∈ {{∀x}, {∃x}}
and for Harrop formulas
 mr (A) = A if A is atomic
 mr (A0 ∧ A1) =  mr A0 ∧  mr A1
 mr (A → B) =
{
∀x .x mr A →  mr B if A is non-Harrop
 mr A →  mr B if A is Harrop
 mr QA = Q( mr A) where Q ∈ {∀x , {∀x}, {∃x}}.
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[[u A]] ≡ xu
[[∧+(M A00 , M A11 )]]
≡ p([[M0]], [[M1]])
≡ [[M1−i ]]
[[∧−i (M A0∧A1)]]
≡ pi ([[M]])
≡ [[M]]
A0, A1 non-Harrop
Ai Harrop
[[→+ (λu A M)]]
≡ λxu .[[M]]
≡ [[M]]
[[→− (M A→B , N A)]]
≡ [[M]][[N]]
≡ [[M]]
A non-Harrop
A Harrop
[[∀+(λx M)]] ≡ λx .[[M]] [[∀−(M, t)]] ≡ [[M]]t
[[∃+λx A(t, M)]]
≡ p(t, [[M]])
≡ t
[[∃−(M∃x A, N)]]
≡ [[N]]p0([[M]])p1([[M]])
≡ [[N]][[M]]
A non-Harrop
A Harrop
[[Caseλp A(M, N)]]
≡ λp.Ifτ (A) p[[M]][[N]]
[[Indλn A(M, N)]]
≡ Recτ (A)[[M]][[N]]
[[Compλx A(M, N)]]
≡ [[M]]
[[EfqA(M)]] ≡ 0τ (A)
(any term of type τ (A))
Fig. 3. Program extraction for the normal rules of HAu.
To every first-order derivation M of a non-Harrop formula A we assign a simply typed
lambda term [[M]], the program extracted from M . The assignment is relative to a given
one-to-one assignment of assumption variables u B , where B is non-Harrop, to object
variables xτ (B)u .
The definition of [[M]] for derivations M ending with a normal rule is as expected and
is shown in Fig. 3. We write ‘r ≡ s’ to express that r and s are syntactically identical (so
no confusion with the formula ‘r = s’ is possible). For uniform rules [[M]] is very simple
and shown in Fig. 4. For convenience we set [[M]] :=  if M derives a Harrop formula.
In the following when we write ‘xu mr B’ where B is a Harrop formula we mean in
fact ‘ mr B’. If P is a predicate of arity (nat), then we set mr(P) to be λn. f n mrP(n)
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[[{∀}+(λx M)]] ≡ [[M]] [[{∀}−(M, t)]] ≡ [[M]]
[[{∃}+λx A(t, M)]] ≡ [[M]]
[[{∃}−(M∃x A, N)]]
≡ [[N]][[M]] if A is non-Harrop
≡ [[N]] if A is Harrop
Fig. 4. Program extraction for the uniform rules of HAu.
where f is a fresh variable of appropriate type, or  mrP(n) depending on whether P is
non-Harrop or Harrop.
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness of Realizability). Assume Γ I1 M : A. Then we have
{xu mr B | u B ∈ Γ } mr(I)1 [[M]] mr A, with reclev([[M]]) ≤ lev(τ (I)) if A is non-
Harrop.
Proof. Induction on M . 
Remark. Of course τ (I) denotes {τ (B) | λnB ∈ I, B non-Harrop} ∪ {ρ | ρ ∈ I type}. A
similar remark applies to mr(I).
In order to use Theorem 3.1 for program extraction we need to relate realizability to
truth. We call a first-order formula A Q-negative respectively Q-positive where Q ∈ {∀, ∃},
if A contains the quantifier Q at negative respectively positive positions only. Note that ∃-
negative formulas A are Harrop.
Lemma 3.2. Let A be a first-order formula.
(i) If A is ∃-negative, then ∅1 A →  mr A.
(ii) If A is ∃-positive, then ∅1 x mr A → A.
Proof. Straightforward simultaneous induction on A. 
Theorem 3.3 (Program Extraction). Let Γ be a set of ∃-negative formulas and A an ∃-
positive formula. Assume Γ I1 M : ∃xρ A. Let r ≡ [[M]] if A is a Harrop formula and
r ≡ p0([[M]]) otherwise. Then Γ mr(I)1 A[r/x] with reclev(r) ≤ lev(τ (I)).
Proof. Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. 
Remarks. 1. Our modified realizability interpretation could be easily extended to a
similar system that allows comprehension for arbitrary (i.p. possibly second-order) Harrop
predicates. The second-order quantifier ∀2 could be treated like a uniform quantifier, that
is, we would set τ (∀2 X A) = τ (A), r mr ∀2 X A = ∀2 X r mr A and [[∀+2 (λX M)]] ≡ [[M]],
[[∀−2 (M,P)]] ≡ [[M]]. Essentially, the interpretation works because the type of a formula
is not changed by substituting a Harrop predicate into it.
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2. Consider ‘uniform induction’ which is like induction except for the step formula
which becomes {∀n}. A→A[n+1/n] (note that uniform induction is weaker than
induction). Obviously, uniform induction is realized by the ‘iterator’ Itρρ→(ρ→ρ)→nat→ρ
with the conversion rules Itρ r s 0 → r and Itρr s (t + 1) → s (Itρ r s t). One can derive
induction from uniform induction and extract from that an implementation of primitive
recursion in terms of iteration. Uniform induction also suffices to prove the classical least
element principle, ¬¬∃n A → ¬¬∃n (A ∧ ∀m < n ¬A[m/n]).
In Section 7 we will be concerned with the problem of constructing a realizer of
an instance of induction on a predicate of the form λn(A ∨ B) where n is not free
in B . According to the soundness Theorem 3.1 we immediately get a realizer that uses
a primitive recursion of type boole × τ (A) × τ (B) and hence has recursion level =
max(lev(τ (A)), lev(τ (B))) (assuming A and B are both non-Harrop). We now show that
the recursion level can be lowered to lev(τ (A)).
In the following we set Ind(P) := P(0) ∧ ∀n (P(n) → P(n + 1)) → ∀n P(n) for any
predicate P of arity nat.
Lemma 3.4. Let A, B be first-order formulas where A is non-Harrop and n : nat a
variable not free in B. Let f, g : nat → boole be fresh variables and h a fresh variable of
type nat → τ (A). Then
{λn.( f n=True→hn mr A)∧gn=True}1 r mr Ind(λn.A ∨ B)
for some term r with reclev(r) = lev(τ (A)).
Proof. Let us assume that B is non-Harrop as well (the other case is similar). Let τ (A) = ρ
and τ (B) = σ . We argue informally. To produce a realizer of Ind(λn.A ∨ B) we assume
(p0, y0, z0) mr (A[0/n] ∨ B), that is,
(p0 = True → y0 mr A[0/n]) ∧ (p0 = False → z0 mr B),
and s mr ∀n (A ∨ B → A[n + 1/n] ∨ B), that is,
∀n ((p, y, z) mr (A ∨ B) → sn(p, y, z) mr (A[n + 1/n] ∨ B)).
We need to realize ∀n (A ∨ B). If p0 = False, then we know z0 mr B and hence
λn(False, 0ρ, z0) mr ∀n (A ∨ B). If p0 = True we define a sequence of triples tn =
(pn, yn, kn) : boole × ρ × nat such that
(1) if pn = True then yn mr A,
(2) if pn = False then pkn = True and p0(skn(True, ykn , 0σ )) = False
(where pi (a0, a1, a2) = ai ). Once we have defined the sequence (tn)n∈N we are done since
then λn(pn, yn, p2(skn(True, ykn , 0σ )) mr ∀n (A ∨ B).
We define the triples tn by primitive recursion on n as follows (note that lev(boole ×
ρ × nat) = lev(ρ)). t0 := (p0, y0, 0) where p0, y0 are given above. In order to define
tn+1 from tn we consider pn . If pn = False we set tn+1 :≡ tn . If pn = True we compute
(p, y, z) :≡ sn(True, yn, 0σ ). If p = True we set tn+1 :≡ (True, y, 0). If p = False we
set tn+1 :≡ (False, 0ρ, n).
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By induction on n one verifies that the triples tn satisfy (1) and (2). Clearly the
conjunction of (1) and (2) is equivalent (provable without induction) to an instance of
the formula ( f n = True → hn mr A) ∧ gn = True, as required. 
Remark. A similar lemma and a similar construction appear in [9] in the context of bounded
arithmetic.
4. Minimal fragments of HAu and partial Gödel translations
One of the main goals of this paper is to extract optimized programs from classical
proofs of first-order existential formulas. The extraction process can be roughly divided
into three phases. First the given classical proof is transformed via Gödel’s negative
translation (double-negating atomic and existential formulas) into a proof in minimal logic
of a formula of the form ¬¬∃x B . Then a Kripke translation further transforms this into an
intuitionistic proof of ∃x B from which we finally extract a program via the realizability
interpretation described in Section 3. In this paper we do not carry out the first phase, but
rather assume that a classical proof of an existence formula is given to us as proof of a
formula ¬¬∃x B in the minimal first-order fragment of HAu.
In general the minimal fragment of an intuitionistic system is obtained by restricting it
such that the formula ⊥ can be treated as a placeholder for an arbitrary formula. In order to
achieve this for our system it is not sufficient to abandon the rule Efq. We must also restrict
the {∀}-introduction in order to prevent the side condition ‘x ∈ CV(M)’ from becoming
violated when ⊥ is replaced by an arbitrary formula.
We call a first-order formula a strong Harrop formula if it contains neither the quantifier
∃ nor the formula ⊥ in a strictly positive position. Obviously if A is a strong Harrop
formula, then A[B/⊥] is a strong Harrop formula for arbitrary first-order formulas B .
We define PCV(M) (potentially computationally relevant variables) like CV(M), but
replacing in the definition ‘Harrop formula’ by ‘strong Harrop formula’. We write
Γ Im M : A
if Γ I M : A and
(1) Γ , A are first order,
(2) the rule Efq is not used in M ,
(3) for every occurrence of a rule {∀}+(λy N) we have y ∈ PCV(N).
For any given set P of predicate constants we define a partial form of Gödel’s double-
negation translation by
gP(A) = A[λ	x¬¬P(	x)/P | P ∈ P].
Lemma 4.1. (i) Let P be a set of predicate constants and A a first-order formula
such that all predicate constants occurring strictly positively in A are in P; then
∅m ¬¬gP(A) → gP(A) (and hence also ∅m ⊥ → gP(A)).
(ii) If A contains neither implications nor universal quantifiers, then we have ∅m
¬gP(A) ↔ ¬A (with respect to any P).
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(iii) If A ∈ qf(P), then DEC(P) ∅m gP(A) ↔ ¬¬(tA = True) (and therefore also
DEC(P) ∅m gP(¬¬∃x A) ↔ ¬¬∃x tA = True).
Proof. Inductions on A. In (iii) one uses (i). 
Unfortunately a partial Gödel translation can be unsound for the rule Comp and for
uniform rules. We therefore we need to further restrict the relation m. We write
Γ Im0 M : A
if Γ Im M : A and in M neither the rule Comp nor a uniform rule occur.
Lemma 4.2. If Γ Im0 M : A, then gP(Γ ) 
gP(I)
m0 gP(A).
Proof. Straightforward induction on M . 
Remark. Abandoning the rule Comp might seem to result in a rather useless calculus.
However, we may add corresponding assumptions, e.g. ∀(r = s → A[r/x] → A[s/x])
(A atomic suffices), to the assumptions Γ . A similar remark applies to the rule Efq. This
means that in fact we still have full intuitionistic logic available. The point of m0 is that
according to the lemma above these assumptions need to be Gödel translated.
5. A Kripke translation
For every first-order formula A and every arithmetic formula K we define a formula AK .
⊥K = K
P(	t)K = P(	t) (P a predicate constant)
(A ∧ B)K = AK ∧ B K
(A → B)K = ∀2Y . (K → Y ) → AY → BY (Y a fresh prop. var.)
(QA)K = QAK (Q any of the four first-order quantifiers).
For the remainder of this section A and B range over first-order and K over arithmetic
formulas. Throughout the rest of the paper X, Y, Z stand for sufficiently fresh propositional
variables.
The obvious proofs of the next two lemmas are omitted.
Lemma 5.1. (i) AX [K/X] = AK .
(ii) A[t/x]K = AK [t/x].
(iii) If A is strongly Harrop then AK is Harrop.
Lemma 5.2. (i) ∅ (K → L) → AK → AL, for any A.
(ii) If C is ⊥-free, i.e. ⊥ does not occur in C, then ∅ C K ↔ C.
Theorem 5.3 (Soundness of Kripke Translation). If Γ Im A then Γ K IY AK .
Proof. Note that, by definition of m, Γ and A are first order, and therefore, by
Theorem 2.3, we may assume that the given derivation of Γ Im A is first order. We argue
by induction on derivations using Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2. For every derivation Γ Im M : A
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one constructs a derivation Γ K IY M ′ : AK such that CV(M ′) ⊆ PCV(M). We only
sketch some of the more interesting cases.
→+: By the induction hypothesis we have Γ Z , AZ IY B Z . With Lemma 5.2(i) it
follows that Γ K , K → Z , AZ IY B Z . Hence Γ K IY (A → B)K .
∀−: We are given Γ Im ∀−(M, t) : A[t/x] derived from Γ Im M : ∀x A. By the
induction hypothesis we have Γ K IY M ′ : ∀x AK with PCV(M ′) = PCV(M). With
Lemma 5.1(ii) it follows that Γ K IY ∀−(M ′, t) : A[t/x]K . By virtue of Lemma 5.1(iii)
we also have CV(∀−(M ′, t)) ⊆ PCV(∀−(M, t)).
Induction: By the (meta)induction hypothesis we have Γ K IY AK [0/n] and Γ K IY
∀n ∀2Y . (K → Y ) → AY → A[n+1/n]Y with A ∈ I. With Lemma 5.1(i) it follows that
Γ K IY ∀n (AK → AK [n + 1/n]) because K is arithmetic. This entails Γ K IY ∀n AK ,
because λn AK is an arithmetic instance of IY .
{∀}+: We assume that we derived Γ Im {∀}+(λyM) : {∀y}A from Γ Im M : A where
y ∈ FV(Γ )∪PCV(M). By the i.h. we have Γ K IY M ′ : AK and y ∈ FV(Γ K )∪CV(M ′).
Hence Γ K IY {∀}+(λyM ′) : {∀y}AK . 
The following lemma shows how the Kripke translation can be used to remove double
negation.
Lemma 5.4. (i) ∀2Y ((B → Y ) → BY → Y ) ∅ (¬¬B)⊥ → B.
(ii) If B is ⊥-free then ∅ (¬¬B)K ↔ (B ∨ K ).
Proof. We argue informally. (i): Assume ∀2Y ((B → Y ) → BY → Y ) and (¬¬B)⊥. The
second assumption is intuitionistically equivalent to
∀2 X . ∀2Y ((X → Y ) → BY → Y ) → X.
Since B is arithmetic we may instantiate X with it and obtain
∀2Y ((B → Y ) → BY → Y ) → B
which yields B by the first assumptions.
(ii): Since B does not contain ⊥, we have, by Lemma 5.2(ii), ∅ (¬B)X ↔ B → X
and therefore
∅ (¬¬B)K ↔ ∀2 X ((K → X) → (B → X) → X).
But ∅ ∀2 X ((K → X) → (B → X) → X) ↔ (B ∨ K ) since B ∨ K is arithmetic. 
6. Definite and goal formulas
In [6] a translation similar to our Kripke translation and a class of ‘goal formulas’ were
defined for which a property similar to the general hypothesis of Lemma 5.4 is provable. It
turns out that the same (even slightly extended) class can be used here.
We call a formula relevant if ⊥ is the only atomic subformula in a strictly positive
position, and co-relevant if ⊥ does not occur in a strictly positive position (the terminology
is inspired from [6]; note that a strong Harrop formula is the same as a first-order
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co-relevant Harrop formula). Relatively to a given set P of predicate constants we
simultaneously define definite formulas D and goal formulas G. We let D0 respectively
G0 range over ⊥-free formulas that are ∃-negative respectively ∃-positive. We also use 
as a placeholder for the first-order universal quantifiers ∀x , {∀x} and  for the existential
quantifiers ∃x , {∃x}.
D := D0 | ⊥ | D ∧ D | D
| G → D provided G co-relevant or D relevant
G := G0 | ⊥ | G ∧ G | G
| G provided G co-relevant
| D → G provided D relevant or D ∈ qf(P).
Since this definition depends on the set P we will sometimes attach the prefix ‘P-’ to the
words ‘definite’ and ‘goal’. Note that definite respectively goal formulas are ∃-negative
respectively ∃-positive.
Lemma 6.1. Set ∆ := LEM(P) and let D and G range over P-definite and P-goal
formulas respectively. Then from LEM(P) we can derive without induction:
(i) (¬D → K ) → DK for D relevant.
(ii) D → DK .
(iii) GK → G for G co-relevant.
(iv) (G → K ) → GK → K .
Proof. The four claims are proved simultaneously by induction on the build-up of
formulas. The proof is similar to the corresponding proof in [6]. Since the definitions have
slightly changed we sketch the arguments anyway.
(i) The case D0 does not apply since any relevant formula must contain ⊥ at least once.
For ⊥ the assertion holds trivially, since ⊥K = K .
Case D1 ∧ D2. Since D1 ∧ D2 is relevant so are D1 and D2. Therefore the assertion
follows directly from the induction hypothesis (i).
Cases D. Assume ¬D → K . In order to proveDK it suffices to prove DK (using
an introduction rule). Since D → D our assumption entails ¬D → K and we can apply
the induction hypothesis (i).
Case G → D. Since G → D is relevant, so is D. Assume ¬(G → D) → K , K → Y
and GY . We have to show DY . By i.h.(i) it suffices to show Y under the extra assumption
¬D. By i.h.(iv) and the assumption GY , showing Y reduces to showing G → Y : from G
and ¬D we obtain ¬(G → D) and hence K , by our first assumption. Since K → Y , we
may conclude Y .
(ii) For the ⊥-free formula we use Lemma 5.2(ii). To derive ⊥ → ⊥K we use the rule
Efq. The cases D1 ∧ D2 and D follow directly from i.h.(ii).
Case G → D where G is co-relevant or D is relevant. Assume G → D and GY .
We have to show DY . If G is co-relevant we use i.h.(iii) and i.h.(ii). If D is relevant we
use i.h.(i) to reduce our goal to Y under the extra assumption ¬D. Now i.h.(iv) and GY
allow us to add the further assumption G. Since the assumptions G, G → D and ¬D are
contradictory, we are done with Efq.
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(iii) For a ⊥-free formula we use again Lemma 5.2(ii). The case ⊥ does not apply. The
cases G1 ∧ G2,  and D follow directly from i.h.(iii). The case D → G follows easily
from i.h.(ii) and i.h.(iii).
(iv) The cases G0 and ⊥ are easy. The cases G1 ∧ G2 and G follow directly from
i.h.(iv).
Case G where G is co-relevant. Direct by i.h.(iii).
Case D → G where D is relevant or ∈ qf(P). Assume (D → G) → K and
(D → G)K . We have to show K . From the first assumption we obtain ¬D → K (+)
using Efq. We also have DK → K (++) using both assumptions and i.h.(iv). If D is
relevant we are done by i.h.(i), (+) and (++). If D ∈ qf(P) we argue by case analysis on
D (using Lemma 2.1)). In case D we use i.h.(ii) and (++), whereas in case ¬D we are
done by (+). 
Theorem 6.2. Let Γ be a set of definite formulas and G a goal formula. Then Γ Im ¬¬G
implies LEM(P),Γ I X G.
Proof. By Theorem 5.3 we have Γ⊥ I X (¬¬G)⊥. By Lemma 6.1(ii) we may replace
Γ⊥ by LEM(P) ∪ Γ . By Lemmas 5.4(i) and 6.1(iv) we may replace (¬¬G)⊥ by G. 
Theorem 6.3. Let Γ , G be as in Theorem 6.2 and I a set of ⊥-free first-order predicates.
Then Γ ¬¬Im ¬¬G implies LEM(P),Γ I∨X1 G.
Proof. By Theorem 6.2 the assumption implies LEM(P),Γ (¬¬I)X G. With Lemma 5.4
(ii) and Theorem 2.3 the assertion follows. 
Note that in I ∨ X above the variable X may be instantiated in the derivation
by an arbitrary arithmetic predicate. The following theorem shows that under certain
circumstances the ‘∨ X’ may be omitted.
Theorem 6.4. Let Γ , G, I be as in Theorem 6.2. Assume that Γ ¬¬Im ¬¬G where in the
derivation for every occurrence of an induction, Indλn¬¬B(M, N), it holds that in M and
N only assumptions from Γ and no inductions are used. Then LEM(P),Γ I1 G.
Proof. The assumptions imply that for every instance of induction over a predicate
λn¬¬Bi we have in fact Γ ∅m ¬¬Bi [0/n], Γ ∅m ∀n .¬¬Bi → ¬¬Bi [n + 1/n] and
Γ ,∧i∀n Bi ∅m ¬¬G. By Theorem 5.3 together with Lemma 5.4(ii) and Lemma 6.1(ii) we
obtain from the first two groups of derivations LEM(P),Γ ∅ Bi [0/n] and LEM(P),Γ ∅
∀n . Bi → Bi [n + 1/n] which together with the third derivation and induction imply
LEM(P),Γ I G. With Theorem 2.3 we obtain first-order derivability. 
7. Programs from classical proofs
We now combine the Kripke translation and the realizability interpretation to extract
programs from classical first-order proofs. Since, as explained in Section 4, we view
classical logic as a subsystem of minimal logic, classical proofs of existential formulas
are subsumed by proofs of the form Γ m ¬¬∃x B . In the formulations of our results
we will give bounds for levels of recursions occurring in extracted programs and
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state for which predicate constants decision procedures are needed. We define the
level of a formula, lev(A), recursively as follows. lev(A) = 0 if A is an atomic
formula; otherwise lev(A ∧ B) = max(lev(A), lev(B)), lev(A → B) = max(lev(A) + 1,
lev(B)), lev(∀xρ A) = max(lev(ρ) + 1, lev(A)), lev(∃xρ A) = max(lev(ρ), lev(A)),
lev({∀x}A) = lev({∃x}A) = lev(A).
Theorem 7.1. Let P be a set of predicate constants and Γ a set of P-definite formulas and
G a P-goal formula. Assume that
Γ ¬¬Im M : ¬¬∃xρ G
where all predicates in I are ⊥-free and all predicates and types in I have level ≤ k. Then
one can extract from M a term r with reclev(r) ≤ k such that
DEC(P),Γ J1 G[r/x]
where J consists of predicates of the form λn.(E → (s mr C)) ∧ F with equations E, F
of type boole and λn.C ∈ I.
Proof. By Theorem 6.3 we have LEM(P),Γ I∨X ∃x G. Lemmas 2.1(ii), 3.4, 3.2,
Theorem 3.3, Lemma 2.1(iii) and Theorem 2.3 give us a term r with reclev(r) ≤ k such
that DEC(P),Γ J1 G[r/x] where the predicates in J are of the required form. 
Remark. If in the proof above one uses Theorem 6.4 instead of Theorem 6.3 (provided
that the additional conditions are satisfied, of course), then one does not need to refer
to Lemma 3.4 and hence obtains slightly improved programs (see the example of the
Fibonacci numbers in Section 8).
In order to make Theorem 7.1 easier to apply it is desirable to replace the rather
complicatedly defined classes of definite and goal formulas by simpler ones. For example,
the class of definite formulas could be replaced by the smaller class of formulas containing
⊥ only positively and  only negatively. However, such a restriction on occurrences of
⊥ excludes many natural situations. For example, in order to make an intuitionistic proof
minimal one might have to add assumptions of the form ∀(⊥ → A) to Γ , which have
⊥ at a negative position. We will now identify classes of formulas that allow unrestricted
occurrences of ⊥, are easier to recognize than definite and goal formulas, do not depend on
a given class P of predicates and can easily be transformed into definite respectively goal
formulas preserving provability.
We call a first-order formula quasi-negative if it is ∃-negative and ∀-positive, that is,
contains existential quantifiers only negatively and universal quantifiers only positively. A
formula is called quasi-positive if it is ∃-positive and ∀-negative.
For any first-order formula A we inductively define a set Crit(A) of so-called “A-
critical” predicate symbols by the following two rules:
(i) Any predicate symbol occurring non-strictly positively (i.e. positively, but not strictly
positively) in A is A-critical.
(ii) If B → C is a strictly positive subformula of A, and ⊥ or an A-critical predicate
symbol occur strictly positively in B , then all predicate symbols occurring strictly
positively in C are A-critical.
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Lemma 7.2. Let A be quasi-negative and P := Crit(A). Then, with respect to P, gP(C)
is definite for every positive subformula C of A, and gP(B) is a goal formula for every
negative subformula B of A.
Proof. Induction on subformulas of A.
Case ⊥. This is a definite and a goal formula.
Case P(	t) positive. If P ∈ P, then P(	t) ∈ qf(P). Hence ¬P(	t) is a goal formula and
therefore gP(P(	t)) = ¬¬P(	t) is definite. If P ∈ P, then gP(P(	t)) = P(	t) is definite as
well.
Case P(	t) negative. The formulas P(	t) and ¬¬P(	t) are both goal formulas (with
respect to any P).
Case B ∧ C (positive or negative). Direct by the induction hypothesis.
Case B → C positive. Since gP(B → C) = gP(B) → gP(C), by the induction
hypothesis, it suffices to show that gP(B) is co-relevant or gP(C) is relevant. If gP(B)
is not co-relevant, then ⊥ or a critical P must occur in B strictly positively. But then all
predicate symbols occurring strictly positively in C are critical, and therefore all strictly
positive positions in C are occupied by critical predicate symbols. Hence gP(C) is relevant
because P ⊇ Crit(A).
Case C → B negative. By a similar argument to the above gP(B) is relevant. Hence
the induction hypotheses can be applied.
Case C positive, B negative. Direct by the induction hypothesis. 
For a set Γ of first-order formulas we set Crit(Γ ) = Crit(A) where A is the conjunction
of all formulas in Γ .
Theorem 7.3. Let Γ be a set of quasi-negative formulas, B a quasi-positive formula and
assume that
Γ ¬¬Im0 M : ¬¬∃xρ B
where the predicates in I are free of ⊥, → and ∀ and have level ≤ k. Then from M one
can extract a term r with lev(r) ≤ k such that
DEC(Crit(Γ ,¬B)),Γ J1 B[r/x]
where J consists of quantifier free predicates.
Proof. Let P = Crit(Γ ,¬B). We have gP(Γ ) gP(¬¬I)m0 ¬¬∃xρ gP(B), by Lemma 4.2,
and with Lemma 4.1(ii) it follows that DEC(P), gP(Γ ) ¬¬Im ¬¬∃xρ gP(B). Since, by
Lemma 7.2, with respect to P the formulas in gP(Γ ) are definite and gP(B) is a goal
formula, and also DEC(P) consists of definite formulas, we can apply Theorem 7.1 and
get a term r with reclev(r) ≤ k and DEC(P), gP(Γ ) J1 gP(B)[r/x] where J consists
of predicates that are ‘propositional in’ formulas of the form s mr C with λnC ∈ I. From
the assumptions on I it follows that the latter formulas are quantifier free. Finally, in the
presence of the assumptions DEC(P) we may remove the Gödel translation and obtain
DEC(P),Γ J1 B[r/x]. 
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Theorem 7.4. Let Γ ,B be as in Theorem 7.3 and assume
Γ ¬¬Im0 M : ¬¬∃xρ B
where all formulas in I are of the form ∃yσ C with C quantifier free and lev(σ ) ≤ k. Then
from M one can extract a term r with lev(r) ≤ k such that
DEC(Crit(Γ ,¬B) ∪ pc(I)),Γ J1 B[r/x]
where J consists of equations of type boole.
Proof. Let P = Crit(Γ ,¬B) ∪ pc(I). By Lemma 4.2 we have gP(Γ ) ¬¬gP(I)m0
¬¬∃xρ gP(B) and with Lemma 4.1(iii) it follows that DEC(P), gP(Γ ) ¬¬I ′m
¬¬∃xρ gP(B) where I ′ consists of predicates of the form ∃yσ E with E a boolean
equation and lev(σ ) ≤ k. As in the proof of Theorem 7.3 we may use Theorem 7.1 to
obtain a term r with reclev(r) ≤ k such that DEC(P), gP(Γ ) J1 gP(B)[r/x], but where
now J consists of boolean equations. Hence DEC(P),Γ J1 B[r/x]. 
Remarks. 1. Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 can be viewed as generalizations of Parsons’ result [16]
on the Π 02 -conservativity of classical Σ
0
1 -arithmetic over primitive recursive arithmetic.
2. The theorems of this section can be extended to the case that among the assumptions
there are formulas that are not definite. For such assumptions realizers of their Kripke
translations are needed in the witnessing term r . An example is the negative translation
of the axiom of countable choice. It is not hard to check that the realizers of other
interpretations of this axiom studied by [3] and [5] are also valid for our Kripke translation.
If we give up controlling the levels of inductions in proofs and the levels of recursions
in extracted programs we could replace our Kripke translation by the simpler ‘Friedman-
style’ translation mapping formula A to A[∃y G/⊥]. This is similar to the translation in [6]
and does not introduce second-order logic. We have then an analogue to Lemma 6.1 and
therefore, as an analogue to Theorem 6.3, that Γ m ¬¬G implies LEM(P),Γ 1 G for
definite Γ and Harrop G. Note that we neither restrict nor control induction. From this we
obtain the following analogues to Theorems 7.1 and 7.3.
Theorem 7.5. Assume that Γ m M : ¬¬∃x G where Γ consists of P-definite formulas
and G is a P-goal formula. Then DEC(P),Γ 1 G[r/x] for some term r extracted from M.
Theorem 7.6. Assume that Γ m0 M : ¬¬∃x B where Γ consists of quasi-negative
formulas and B is a quasi-positive formula. Then DEC(Crit(Γ ,¬B)),Γ 1 B[r/x] for
some term r extracted from M.
Remark. As pointed out by Ulrich Kohlenbach a result similar to Theorem 7.6 can be
obtained via Gödel’s Dialectica Interpretation [11] (see also [19]). Indeed it is easily
seen that the Dialectica Interpretation of a quasi-negative formula A is (up to provable
equivalence) of the form ∀x A0 with ∅1 A → ∀x A0. Similarly a quasi-positive formula
B has a Dialectica Interpretation ∃x B0 with B0 quantifier free and ∃x B0 → B . From this
and the soundness theorem for the Dialectica Interpretation, Theorem 7.6 readily follows,
however without control on the use of decidability of predicates in terms of Γ and B alone
(in the Dialectica Interpretation the use of decidability depends on the derivation M).
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8. Examples
We now discuss some simple examples illustrating our methods of extracting programs
form proofs. To begin with we consider the following specification of the reverse of a list
(we use Haskell notation for lists and operations on lists).
REV([], []). (1)
REV(v,w) → REV(v ++[x], x :w). (2)
Suppose we want to extract a program reversing lists from a proof of
∀v ∃w REV(v,w). (3)
One way to prove (3) constructively is to prove first that any non-empty list is of the form
v ++ [x] and then use induction on the length of v to prove (3). Another (slightly better)
solution is to add an axiom stating that REV is symmetric (from (1) and (2) symmetry does
not follow) and prove ∀v ∃w REV(w, v) by a straightforward list induction on v. Clearly,
the programs extracted from either proofs yield quadratic time algorithms for reversing
lists. For example, the latter yields
reverse1 [] = []
reverse1 (x : v) = (reverse v) ++ [x]
Now let us see what we get if we prove (3) classically. We assume that (some fixed) v0
were not reversible, that is
¬∃w REV(v0, w). (4)
and try to derive (in minimal arithmetic) a contradiction. Informally, from (2) it follows
immediately that if v ++[x] is not reversible then v is not either. Hence, inductively, it
follows from (4) that all initial segments of v0 are non-reversible, and in particular the
empty list is not reversible contradicting (1). More formally we prove
v ++ u = v0 → ¬∃w REV(v,w). (5)
by induction on u, using our (false) assumption (4) to prove the base case and (2) and
associativity of ++ to prove the step. Instantiating (5) with v = [], u = v0 and w = []
yields a contradiction to (1).
At this point uniform quantifiers come into play, since we observe that we can prove (5)
in fact uniformly in v, that is
∀u {∀v} . v ++ u = v0 → ¬∃w REV(v,w). (6)
It is instructive to examine the step in the inductive proof of (6) in detail. Assume
v ++ (x : u) = v0 and REV(v,w). We have to prove ⊥. From the first assumption it follows
that (v ++ [x])++u = v0, by associativity of ++ , and from the second assumption
we get REV(v ++[x], x :w), by (2). Instantiating the induction hypothesis, which is
{∀v′} . v′ ++ u = v0 → ¬∃w′ REV(v′, w′), with v′ = v ++ [x] and w′ = x :w we obtain
⊥. In order for this to be a correct derivation in minimal (uniform) arithmetic (m) it is
crucial that v has not become computationally relevant: The first instantiation does not
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count because it is an application of the rule {∀}− and in the second instantiation – which
does count because it is an application of the rule ∃+ – the variable v does not occur.
To this derivation Theorem 7.1 (or Theorem 7.3) can be applied with Γ consisting of
the (universal closures of) (1) and (2) (and, for convenience, associativity of ++ ) and
B = REV(v0, w). Then Γ is a set of goal formulas and B is definite with respect to
P := ∅. The extracted program is the well-known linear time algorithm for reversing lists:
reverse2 v0 = rev v0 [] where
rev [] w = w
rev (x : u) w = rev u (x : w)
If in (6) we had quantified the variable v non-uniformly (∀v ), then it would appear in the
extracted program as a (superfluous) parameter of the subroutine:
reverse3 v0 = rev v0 [] [] where
rev [] v w = w
rev (x : u) v w = rev u (v ++ [x]) (x : w)
It should be noted that although obviously reverse3 can be transformed into reverse2,
a formal proof of the correctness of this transformation requires induction (exercise: on
which predicate?). On the other hand the correct application of the uniform rules is easily
checked mechanically (without any proof calculus being involved).
In order to demonstrate the effect of the refinements (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 7.1 we
use the example of the Fibonacci numbers in [6]. The graph of the Fibonacci sequence is
axiomatized by
FIB(0, 0) ∧ FIB(1, 1). (7)
FIB(n, k) → FIB(n + 1, l) → FIB(n + 2, k + l). (8)
In [6] from a proof in minimal arithmetic of (essentially)
∀n ¬¬∃k FIB(n, k). (9)
the following program was extracted (which is linear in the unary representation of natural
numbers):
fibonacci1 n = fib n (\k -> \l -> k) where
fib n f = if n == 0
then f 0 1
else fib (n-1) (\k -> \l -> f l (k+1))
The type level 2 recursion is due to the fact that the proof contains an induction on the
following generalization of (9)
∀n ¬¬∃k, l (FIB(n, k) ∧ FIB(n + 1, l)). (10)
Using our Theorem 7.1 the recursion can be lowered to level 0.
fibonacci2 n = (let (_,(k,_),_) = fibaux n in k) where
fibaux n = if n == 0
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then (True,(0,1),0)
else let (p,(k,l),m) = fibaux (n-1)
in if p == True
then (True,(l,k+l),0)
else (p,(k,l),m)
This program has approximately the same time complexity as fibonacci1. The triples
(p,(k,l),m) come from Lemma 3.4 which is used in Theorem 7.1. They are clearly
unnecessary because p will always have the value True (on the other hand they do not
slow down the program very much either). The triples are avoided when we follow the
advice in the remark after Theorem 7.1 and derive the program directly from Theorem 6.4
(avoiding Lemma 3.4). This is possible, since the only induction in the proof does meet the
required constraints.
fibonacci3 n = fst (fibpair n) where
fibpair n = if n == 0
then (0,1)
else let (k,l) = fibpair (n-1)
in (l,k+l)
Finally, if we use the method in [9] to extract a program we obtain the following:
fibonacci4 n = fst (fibaux n) where
fibaux n = if n == 0
then if cfib (0,0) && cfib (1,1)
then (0,1)
else (0,0)
else let (k,l) = fibaux (n-1)
in if cfib (n,l) && cfib (n+1,k+l)
then (l,k+l)
else (0,0)
where cfib is supposed to compute the characteristic function of the graph of the
Fibonacci sequence.
9. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a system HAu of uniform Heyting arithmetic and developed a
refined method of extracting programs from classical proofs that in several respects extends
and improves methods known so far. The main results are summarized in Theorems 7.1,
7.3 and 7.4, where we give conditions under which from a minimal HAu proof of ¬¬∃y B
from assumptions Γ a witnessing term for the existential quantifier ∃y can be extracted.
In addition we give bounds for the levels of recursions and decision procedures used in the
extracted term. It seems fair to say that the ideas in the papers [4,9,6], which formed the
starting point of our work, fit together very well and support each other. By joining them,
new results have been obtained.
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One might object that the system HAu is rather complex and not easy to use, in par-
ticular as regards applications in program development. This might be partially true, but
on the other hand if a proof is constructed with an extracted program in mind, the use of
uniform and non-uniform quantifiers is quite natural since it makes the computational role
of variables explicit. The system HAu can also be used as method for optimizing ordinary
proofs in HAω with respect to program extraction. Given an HAω proof M of a formula A,
from assumptions Γ one can tag certain quantifiers in A and Γ as uniform and then test
whether in the derivation M certain occurrences of rules can be modified into their uni-
form version such that the result is a correct HAu derivation (with an optimized extracted
program). Clearly it is decidable whether such a modification of rules is possible.
This and previous work on program extraction from constructive and classical proofs
has been strongly inspired by Helmut Schwichtenberg’s MINLOG system [2]. MINLOG is
an implementation of Heyting arithmetic in finite types customized by a flexible rewrite
system and ML-like polymorphism. MINLOG supports program extraction from construc-
tive and classical proofs via modified realizability and A-translation. Our system HAu to-
gether with optimized program extraction has been partly implemented in MINLOG.
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